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IN

BJ: FLUay

[67 C.2d

[Crim. No. 11116. In Bank. Nov. 6, 1967.]

In re WARREN ELWOOD FLUERY on Habeas Corpus.
[1] Prisons and Prisoners-Parol~Fixing Term of Imprisonment
-.Jail Time.-A man jailed under an Adult Authority order
suspending, canceling or revoking parole is not "an escape and
f~tive" within the meaning of Pen. Code, § 3064, relating to
the effect of such suspension or revocation, and such jail time
must be credited as time served; such rule applies equally to
time spent in jail while the Adult Authority is determining
whether a prisoner should be reinstated on parole and to time
spent in jail after the Adult Authority has decided to return
him to state prison and is arranging to transport him there.
(Overruling contrary holding in In re Payton, 28 Ca1.2d 194,
196 [169 P.2d 361] and disapproving the contrary implication in
In re Hall, 63 Ca1.2d 115, 117 [45 Cal.Rptr.133, 403 P.2d 349]).
[2] Id.-Parol~Fixing Term of Imprisonment-Jail Time: 0$inal Law-Punishment-Oomputation of Time.-Where one on
parole from state prison was jailed in October for a misdemeanor offense, then had his parole canceled in December by
the Adult Authority and ordered returned to prison, and was
so returned from jail the following March, he was entitled to
credit, as time served, for the period from October to December because he was still on parole, from December to March as
it was jail time pending his return to prison after an Adult
Authority order canceling his parole, and for the whole period,
October to March, because the misdemeanor sentence was
silent as to, and therefore concurrent with, his prison sentence
(Pen. Code, § 669).

PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from
custody. Order to show cause discharged; writ denied.
Warren Elwood Fluery, in pro. per., and Robert C. Anderson, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Robert R. Granucci
and Horace Wheatley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Prisons and Prisoners, § 128; Am. Jur. , Pardon, Reprieve and Amnesty (1st ed § 93):
iricK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Prisons and Prisoners, § 14; Criminal Law, § 1483.
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TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioner, an inmate of San Quentin
Prison, applied for a writ of habeas ~orpus on the ground that
the Adult Authority improperly refused him credit on his
prison term for tiine spent in jail. The allegations of his petition and the Summary of Sentence Data prepared by the
Department of Corrections showed that contrary to In re Patto'n, 225 Cal.App.2d 83, 87 [36 Cal.Rptr. 864], he was not
credited for time served under a misdemeanor sentence that
ran concurrently with his prison sentence and that contrary
t.o Aguilera v. Califorwia Dept. of Oorrections, 247 Cal.App.2d
150, 153 [55 Cal.Rptr. 292], he was not credited for time.in
jail under the restraint of Adult Authority orders. The
alleged facts also gave rise to the question, expressly left open
in Aguilera, whether a prisoner jailed under an Adult
Authority order suspending or cancelling his parole and
directing his return to prison can be denied credit for his time
in jail on the theory that he was returned to prison without
unreasonable delay.
We issued an order to show cause. Respondent warden filed
his return showing. that petitioner has now been credited with
the disputed periods of jail time. Although the issuance of our
order to show cau..c;:e has resulted in this petitioper's receiving
the relief he applied for, we deem it appropriate in our supervision of the administration of criminal justice to decide the
questions he presented. Petitions for habeas corpus filed by
. -other prisoners indicate that sentences are still being computed contrary to the holdings of Patto'n and Aguilera, and
the question expressly undecided by Aguilera is a recurring
problem important to other prisoners and the Adult Authority. (See D. I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior C01trt, 60 Cal.2d
723, 731, fn. 5 [36 Cal.Rptr. 468, 388 P.2d 700] ; County of
Madera v. Gendron, 59 Ca1.2d 798, 804 [31 Cal.Rptr. 302, 382
P.2d 342, 6 A.L.R.3d 555] ; Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. Department of Employme'nt, 56 Cal.2d 54, 58 [13 Cal.Rptr. 663, 362
P.2d 487] ; In re Newber'n, 55 Cal.2d 500, 505 [11 Cal.Rptr.
547, 360 P.2d 43] ; America'n Civil L10erties U'nio'n v. Board
. of Educatio'n, 55 Cal.2d 167, 181 [10 Cal.Rptr. 647, 359 P.2d
45,94 A.L.R.2d 1259].)
Petitioner is serving a prison sentence for second degree
burglary (maximum term 15 years: Pen. Code, § 461) that
began September 5, 1958. In 1961 the Adult Authority
released him on parole. On April 12, 1962, it cancelled his
parole and ordered. his return to prison. For seven days, until
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his return to prl~on on April 19, he was held in jail as a
parole violator ordered returned to prison.
In 1963 petitioner was again paroled. On September 3,
1965, the Adult Authority suspended his parole and ordered
his return to prioon. He was at large for four days after the
making of the order of September 3. From September 7, 1965,
until March 10, 1966, he was in jail as a parole violator. Also
during this time, under the name Howard Emerson Ellwood,
he was tried for and c.onvicted of possessing narcotics,
granted probation, and from December 1, 1965, to March 1,
1966, was held in Jail as a condition of probation as well as
under the order of the Adult Authority. On March 10 he was
removed from jail to state prison.
In May 1966 petitioner was again paroled. In October 1966,
under the name Howard Emerson Ellwood, he was convicted
of attempted burglary and sentenced to one year in the
county jail. On December 28, 1966, while he was serving this
jail sentence, the Adult Authority cancelled his parole and
ordered his return to prison. On March 16, 1967, he was
returned to prison.
At the time petitioner applied for habeas corpus the Adult
Auth~rity had computed all the time he spent in jail as "at
large ,', . time not credited on his 1958 sentence. Penal Code
section 3064 provides that" From and after the suspension or
revocation of th~ parole of any prisoner and until his return
to custody he shall be deemed an escape and fugitive from
justice and no part of the time during which he is an escape
and fugitive from justice shall be part of his term.' ,
Although section 3064 refers to a prisoner's return to custody, not his return to state prison. we recently stated in
summary of the substance of the statute that "the time
between a valid order of suspension and his actual return to
state prison i~ not credited to his term." (I'll, re Hall, 63
Cal.2d 115, 117 [45 Cal.Rptr. 133,403 P.2d 389].) Moreover,
in I'll, re Payton, 28 Ca1.2d 194, 196 [169 P.2d 361], we held
that "the petitioner was 3. fugitive from justice" and not
entitled to credit on his prison term for 35 days from the date
of an order suspending parole and directing that he be
arrested and retained in custody to the ·date of his actual
return to prison. I'll, re Payton mistakenly classified the petitioner as a fugitive during the entire 35-day period at issue
despite the fact that during at least part of that period he
was in jail both pursuant to the order suspending parole and
Wlder a misdemeanor sentence.
,.
. !
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[1] For the reasons stated in Aguilera, supra, 247 Cal.
App.2d 150, we now hold that in computing time served the
Adult Authority ('annot disregard or add to the prison term
time spent in actual custody in jail under it,; own orders
suspending, ~ancelling, or revoking parole. (Accord, In re
Clark, 254 Cal.App.2d 1 [61 Cal.Rptr. 902].) A man jailed
under such an order cannot be "deemed an escape and fugitive" from the very body that is restraining him. The contrary holding in In re Payton, supra. 28 Cal.2d 194, 196, is
overruled and the contrary implication in In re Hall, supra, 63
Cal.2d 115, 117, is disapproved.
The reasoning of Aguilera applies equally to time spent in
jail under an Adult Authority order while that body is determining whether a prisoner should be reinstated on parole and
to time spent in jail under such an order after the Adult
Authority has decided to return him to state prison and is
arranging to transport him there.
[2] We further hold in accord with In re Patton, supra,
225 Cal.App.2d b3, 85, 87, that the Adult Authority must
credit petitioner for the time served in jail under the 1966
misdemeanor sentence that was silent as to, and therefore concurrent with, his prison sentence. (Pen. Code, § 669.) During
the first part of that sentence, from its inception in October
1966 until the Adult Authority's cancellation order of
December 28, 1966, petitioner was still on parole and therefore
entitled to credit for that time. (See Ex parte Casey, 160 Cal.
357, 358 [116 P. 1104].) When the Adult Authority cancelled
his parole, he did not become a fictional fugitive; he is entitled to credit for the jail time served from December 28, 1966,
t.o March 17, 1967, both for the reasons stated in Patton and
for the reasons stated in Aguilera.
Since the Adult Authority's records will disclose whether
prisoners were in fact at large or whether they were in actual
custody outside -a prison pUt'Suant to orders suspending or
cancelling parole, questions of credit for time in jail like those
raised here can be settled by the Adult Authority without
requiring prisoners to resort to the courts to obtain correction
of the computations of their sentences. (Cf. In re Portwood,
236 Cal.App.2d 321,324 [45 Cal.Rptr. 862].)
The order to show cause is discharged and the petition for
habeas corpus is dismissed.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J.,
and Sullivan, J., concurred.

